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The economic determinants of compensation committee quality 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the economic determinants of 
compensation committee quality.   
Design/methodology/approach – Sample firms were selected from the IRRC Directors’ 
database.  Compensation committee quality is measured as the factor score from a principal 
component analysis of six compensation committee characteristics.  Regression analyses are 
conducted to test the hypotheses. 
Findings – It was found that firms with lower CEO influence, less institutional shareholders, 
fewer growth opportunities, and that are smaller in size are more likely to have high quality 
compensation committees.   
Practical implications – The results imply that even in the presence of a requirement to have 
only independent directors on the compensation committee, the quality of compensation 
committees can vary cross-sectionally depending on the firm’s economic circumstances.   Thus, 
a one-size fits all solution for compensation committee quality might not be optimal as different 
firms have different incentives in composing their compensation committees. 
Originality/value – This paper adds to the limited literature on compensation committees by 
using a new measure of compensation committee quality to examine the economic factors that 
affect the governance quality of independent compensation committees.  This paper also 
complements the board and audit committee research by examining whether the same factors 
that affect board and audit committee quality might also affect compensation committee quality. 
Keywords  Economic determinants, Compensation committee, Corporate governance. 
Paper type  Research paper 
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1.        Introduction 
 
While boards of directors and audit committees have attracted widespread interest from 
academic researchers, the research on compensation committees is limited (e.g., Klein, 2003).  
This is surprising since the literature on executive compensation is vast (e.g., Balsam and 
Miharjo, 2007; Harford and Lai, 2007; Ortiz-Molina, 2007; Sundaram and Yermack, 2007).  We 
help address this void by considering the economic characteristics of firms that have high quality 
compensation committees.   
            Compensation committees play a central role in setting, implementing, and monitoring 
the company’s compensation policy and programs.  Their duties include “(1) overseeing the 
company’s compensation policy, programs, and practices for executive officers and directors, (2) 
reviewing the performance of and setting compensation levels for executive officers, (3) 
overseeing and evaluating the company’s management development and succession planning, (4) 
establishing annual incentive programs for executive officers, (5) administering the company’s 
equity-based and other long-term incentive compensation programs, and (6) advising the full 
board of significant issues and actions” (Tauber and Silverman, 2003).  Although the 
compensation committee might make recommendations to the full board of directors for final 
approval, the compensation committee has the sole authority to determine the compensation for 
all executive officers in the company, including the CEO.  High quality compensation 
committees set more efficient executive compensation to enhance the alignment of the interests 
of managers and shareholders and thus maximize firm value.   
Since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted in 2002, compensation committees have 
become one of the targets for corporate governance regulation.  One concern of regulating 
compensation committee composition is that the benefits and costs of the regulation could vary 
across firms.  Thus, it is important to examine how firms differ in their demand for compensation 
committee governance.  Research on the economic determinants of compensation committee 
quality can have implications for regulators and their policies.  
          Although prior studies examine economic factors that are associated with the quality of the 
board (e.g., Rediker and Seth, 1995; Bathala and Rao, 1995; Baker and Gompers, 2003; Boone et 
al., 2007) or audit committee (e.g., Klein, 2002; Feldmann and Schwarzkopf, 2003), it is not 
clear whether we can infer the economic determinants of compensation committee quality from 
these studies.  The role of the compensation committee is different from the roles of boards and 
audit committees.  Boards have a central role in stewardship and the monitoring of management, 
while audit committees oversee the financial reporting process.  Thus, it is important to consider 
the characteristics of firms that demand high quality compensation committees.   
          We are aware of only one prior study that uses U.S. data to examine the economic factors 
associated with compensation committee independence.  Newman (2000) focuses on the impact 
of ownership structure on compensation committee independence (a proxy for compensation 
committee quality) where compensation committee independence is measured by the proportion 
of independent directors on the board.  However, in 2003, the major stock exchanges in the U.S. 
changed their listing rules to require that compensation committees are composed of only 
independent directors (see NYSE Corporate Governance 303A.05, NASDAQ Rule 4350(c), and 
AMEX Enhanced Corporate Governance Rules Sec. 805).  As a result, Newman’s (2000) 
measure of compensation committee quality (i.e., independence) is no longer valid since, under 
the 2003 listing rules, the variation in compensation committee independence across firms is 
zero.1  Thus, we contribute to the literature by examining the relation between firm 
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characteristics and a different measure of compensation committee quality that does not depend 
on the independence of compensation committee members. 
            Recently, Sun et al. (2009) develop a more comprehensive and richer measure of 
compensation committee quality using six measures related to the committee’s composition – the  
proportion of compensation committee members who were not appointed by the incumbent CEO 
(Daily et al., 1998), the proportion of committee members who are senior directors (Vafeas, 
2003), the proportion of committee members who are CEOs of the other firms (Daily et al., 
1998), the proportion of committee members who have large block shareholdings in the firm 
(Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999), the proportion of committee members who are directors in 
fewer than three other firms (Coles and Hoi, 2003), and compensation committee size (Agrawal 
and Knoeber, 1999)  – to measure compensation committee quality.  As none of the six measures 
is likely to capture compensation committee quality by itself, they conduct a principal 
components analysis (PCA) to reduce the six measures into a single factor representing 
compensation committee quality.2  They then examine whether the compensation committee 
quality factor affects the relation between stock option grants and future firm performance – 
measured by future operating performance or future stock returns.  They find a positive effect.  
Sun et al. (2009) interpret their findings as evidence that high quality compensation committees 
write superior compensation contracts that improve incentive alignment.  From our standpoint, 
these findings validate their factor as a measure of compensation committee quality. 
 We compute a measure of compensation committee quality conducting a PCA on the 
same six compensation committee characteristics used by Sun et al. (2009).3  We then examine 
the firm characteristics that are associated with higher quality compensation committees.  We 
expect that CEO influence, institutional ownership, growth opportunities, and firm size are likely 
to be related to compensation committee quality.  We find all four factors are significantly 
related to our compensation committee quality factor – specifically, firms with lower CEO 
influence, less institutional shareholders, fewer growth opportunities, and that are smaller in size 
are more likely to have high quality compensation committees.  Our findings suggest that a one-
size fits all solution for compensation committee quality might not be optimal since different 
firms have different incentives in composing their compensation committees. 
We contribute to the literature in the following ways.  First, while there has been limited 
research on compensation committee quality, the setting of executive compensation continues to 
attract public interest.  For example, in 2007, the U.S. House Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform issued a report that found that conflicts of interests involving the use of 
compensation consultants could result in higher levels of executive compensation (Waxman, 
2007).  Likewise, in 2006, the SEC added a requirement that companies provide a 
“Compensation Disclosure and Analysis” section to their annual proxy statement (SEC, 2006).  
Our research addresses the paucity of empirical research on compensation committee quality.  At 
the same time, we provide insights that may assist regulators and investors in understanding the 
make-up of compensation committees.  
Second, we contribute to the literature on corporate governance more generally.  Our 
study is similar in spirit to prior studies that examine factors affecting board and audit committee 
quality (e.g., Klein, 2002; Baker and Gompers, 2003).  That is, we examine firm characteristics 
that are likely to affect the demand for high quality compensation committees.  Thus, we 
complement the board and audit committee research by examining whether the same factors that 
affect board and audit committee quality might also affect compensation committee quality. 
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           The remainder of this study is organized as follows.  The second section reviews the 
literature.  The third section develops the hypotheses.  The fourth section discusses the research 
design.  The fifth section presents the empirical results, and the last section concludes. 
 
2.        Literature review 
 
            Prior research into the economic determinants of board or committee quality focuses on 
board or audit committee independence.  Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) find that board 
independence decreases as the CEO nears retirement but increases after a firm performs poorly 
and when a firm discontinues a business.  Rediker and Seth (1995) document evidence that board 
independence is negatively associated with block shareholdings, managerial shareholdings, and 
stock ownership of inside directors.  Bathala and Rao (1995) find that board independence is 
negatively related to managerial ownership, dividend payout, debt leverage, growth, volatility, 
and CEO tenure, and is positively related to institutional holdings.  Baker and Gompers (2003) 
find that board independence decreases with the power of the CEO, and that board independence 
is higher when firms are backed by venture capital.              
           Boone et al. (2007) find that board independence is positively associated with the 
complexity of the firm’s operations, outside director ownership, and negatively associated with 
CEO influence, and the costs of monitoring.   Linck et al. (2008) find that high growth 
opportunities, high R&D expenditure, and high stock return volatility are associated with less 
board independence. They also find that high managerial ownership is associated with less board 
independence, but boards are more independent when insiders’ opportunity for extracting private 
benefits is high. Lehn et al. (2009) find that firm size and growth opportunities explain a large 
amount of the cross-sectional and temporal variation in board independence which increases in 
firm size and decreases in growth opportunities. 
           Klein (2002) finds that audit committee independence is positively associated with board 
size and board independence, and negatively associated with growth opportunities, the incidence 
of losses, the presence of block shareholders on audit committees, and firm size. Feldmann and 
Schwarzkopf (2003) find that audit committee independence increases as institutional holdings 
increase for firms with institutional ownership of less than 15%.  Piot (2004) finds that audit 
committee independence is negatively related to inside ownership, the quality of financial 
reporting and is positively related to leverage. Ruiz-Barbadillo et al. (2007) find that audit 
committee independence is negative associated with CEO duality and managerial ownership. 
          Since compensation committees play a different role than boards or audit committees, the 
results on boards or audit committees may not hold for compensation committees.  Nevertheless, 
there is limited research on the economic determinants of compensation committee quality.  
Using data for 158 U.S. firms in 1992, Newman (2000) finds that the presence of insiders is 
positively associated with CEO ownership, but is negatively associated with non-executive 
employees’ ownership, sales, and board independence.  Cotter and Silvester (2003) use 
Australian data to examine whether compensation committee independence is associated with 
non-independent directors’ equity, dividend payout, leverage, number of directors representing a 
substantial shareholder, firm diversification, growth options, financial performance, and firm 
size.  They do not find any significant relationships between compensation committee 
independence and these firm characteristics.  Unlike Newman (2000) and Cotter and Silvester 
(2003), Vafeas (2000) investigates the economic determinants of being a compensation 
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committee member.  He finds that the likelihood of compensation committee membership is 
related to director type, board tenure, and the number of other directorships held.   
   
3.        Hypotheses            
 
            Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) develop a model in which board composition is the 
outcome of a negotiation between the CEO and outside directors.  They argue that the proportion 
of outside directors on the board decreases with the CEO influence over outside directors.  CEOs 
use their influence to extract rents by placing insiders and affiliated outsiders in board positions.  
Consistent with Hermalin and Weisbach’s argument, Bathala and Rao (1995), Baker and 
Gompers (2003), and Kieschnick and Moussawi (2004) document evidence that board 
independence decreases with CEO influence.  Also, Boone et al. (2007) find that board 
independence is negatively associated with CEO influence, suggesting that CEOs wield their 
influence over board formation.  Lorsch and MacIver (1989) provide survey evidence that CEOs 
wield major influence in selecting new board members, while Tejada (1997) provides anecdotal 
evidence of an outside director of one prominent company who was not nominated for re-
election after criticizing management.  
            Managerial entrenchment occurs when managers become difficult to remove or replace 
which can leave them with excessive power (e.g., Weisbach, 1988).  CEOs are likely to be more 
involved in selecting directors on the compensation committee if they have greater power.  
Fahlenbrach (2009) documents that CEOs receive higher total compensation and a higher annual 
increase in compensation if the balance of power between shareholders and managers is slanted 
towards managers, suggesting that high managerial power leads to excess compensation.  
Therefore, we expect that compensation committee governance quality will be negatively 
associated with CEO influence.  Our first hypothesis is as follows:   
          H1.  Compensation committee quality is negatively associated with CEO influence.   
 
          Because of the higher costs of pursuing the ‘exit’ mechanism for big portfolios (i.e., 
selling shares), existing institutional owners who are dissatisfied with management can have 
incentives to maintain their shareholdings and increase their monitoring of management (e.g., 
Bathala and Rao, 1995).  Anecdotal evidence shows that large institutional investors persuaded 
Champion International to add more outside directors on the board (Pulliam, 1993).  Bathala and 
Rao (1995) document that the proportion of outside directors on the board is positively 
associated with the proportion of institutional holdings.  Feldman and Schwarzkopf (2003) find 
that both board independence and audit committee independence increase with institutional 
holdings.  These results suggest that institutional investors can improve corporate governance 
quality by enhancing board or audit committee quality.  In other words, institutional 
shareholding can be complementary to other governance mechanisms.   
            In contrast, other research suggests that institutional investors actively play a monitoring 
role (e.g., Demsetz, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Jarrell and Poulsen, 1987; Brickley et al., 
1988; Agrawal and Mandelker, 1990), which means that they can directly monitor management 
themselves through their control rights.  In this case, institutional investors can monitor 
management even if other monitoring mechanisms are weak.  Thus, institutional investors could 
serve as substitutes for other monitoring mechanisms.  Consistent with this argument, Rediker 
and Seth (1995) find that board independence is negatively associated with block shareholder 
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equity stakes, suggesting that block shareholders can substitute for the monitoring roles played 
by outside directors.   
            Recently, Fahlenbrach (2009) finds that institutional ownership concentration is 
negatively associated with pay-for-performance.  This suggests that institutional investors can 
substitute for CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity, i.e., institutional investors can also improve 
incentive alignment.  Since CEO pay-for-performance is a function of compensation committee 
quality, Fahlenbrach’s (2009) results suggest that the governance quality of compensation 
committees could be negatively associated with institutional holdings.   
Thus, as either a positive or negative association between governance quality of 
compensation committees and institutional ownership may exist, we examine the following non-
directional hypothesis: 
             H2.  Compensation committee quality is associated with institutional ownership.    
 
 Myers (1977) decomposes firm value into two parts: 1) real assets or assets-in-place, and 
2) real or growth options which are assets yet to be acquired.  As Alchian and Woodward (1988) 
contend, growth options involve discretionary decisions on the part of managers.  Gaver and 
Gaver (1993) note that these decisions can be hard to monitor because lacking the inside 
information and specialized knowledge of managers, outside shareholders cannot ascertain the 
“menu” of growth options that are available to the firm.  Since managers of firms with more 
growth options must make and implement more investment decisions, it is important for these 
firms to properly incentivize their managers in order to ensure their investment decisions 
maximize firm value. 
 Because traditional accounting numbers are less likely to accurately reflect the future 
performance implications of managerial decisions made today for firms with more growth 
options, Ittner et al. (2003) argue that these firms should rely more heavily on equity-based 
compensation since stock prices are forward-looking and based on a longer-time horizon.  Their 
empirical evidence supports this prediction.  Since high growth firms rely more on equity-based 
incentives to align managers’ and shareholders’ interest, these firms may rely less on traditional 
corporate governance mechanisms.  For example, Bathala and Rao (1995), Lehn et al. (2009), 
and Linck et al. (2008) find that board governance quality is negatively associated with growth 
opportunities, while Klein (2002) finds that audit committee governance quality is also 
negatively associated with growth opportunities.  Thus, these studies support a substitution effect 
between equity-based compensation and other corporate governance mechanisms for high 
growth option firms.  Similarly, high growth option firms may be able to place less emphasis on 
having a high quality compensation committee.  We formulate the following hypothesis:      
            H3. Compensation committee quality is negatively associated with growth opportunities.     
 
            Barclay and Smith (1995a; 1995b) argue that agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders increase with firm size.  For example, top managers of larger firms may hold a 
lower percentage of equity than their counterparts of smaller firms which can increase agency 
costs.  Also, larger firms may have larger free cash flows leading to greater managerial discretion 
over investments, and Boone et al. (2007) argue that larger firms are more diversified and have a 
wider scope of operations.  This means that specific knowledge is more likely to reside at lower 
levels in the corporate hierarchy which can increase information asymmetry and make 
monitoring more difficult.  Thus, the demand for monitoring managers may increase with firm 
size.  Prior research provides some evidence supporting a relation between the proportion of 
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outside directors on the board and firm size.  For example, Lehn et al. (2009) and Boone et al. 
(2007) find board independence is positively associated with firm size.   
Other studies (e.g., Hossain et al., 2000; Prevost et al., 2002) find that board 
independence is negatively associated with firm size.  A negative association between board 
independence and firm size could be explained by Rosenstein and Wyatt’s (1990) view that large 
firms may have more alternative monitoring mechanisms such as institutional investors and stock 
analysts, and therefore have a lower demand for outside directors sitting on the board.  In 
addition, Klein (2002) argues that larger firms have stronger internal control systems that could 
be used as an alternative monitoring mechanism to audit committee independence. Consistent 
with her argument, she finds that audit committee independence is negatively associated with 
firm size. 
          Thus, the association between compensation committee governance quality and firm size 
may be positive or negative.  The fourth hypothesis is as follows: 
           H4.    Compensation committee quality is associated with firm size.     
 
 
4.        Research design 
 
4.1       Sample selection 
 
            The sample selection starts with searching the IRRC Directors’ database for the U.S. 
companies with compensation committees consisting solely of independent directors in 2001.4  
This procedure yields a raw sample of 1,225 firms.  The IRRC Directors’ database provides the 
data of directors’ characteristics including their ages, employee positions, board service time, 
committee memberships, board affiliations, and shareholdings for about 1,500 U.S. firms 
(primarily drawn from S&P 500, and other large corporations) mainly derived from proxy 
statements.  The distribution of the 1,225 firms is 45.76% in manufacturing industry, 16.68% in 
services industry, 12.20% finance, insurance, and real estate industry, 10.02% in transportation, 
communication, electric, gas, and sanitary services industry, 7.29% in retail trade industry, and 
8.05% in other industries.  For the population of all firms in the Compustat database, the 
distribution is 37.31% in manufacturing industry, 20.17% in services industry, 19.02% in 
finance, insurance, and real estate industry, 8.26% in transportation, communication, electric, 
gas, and sanitary services industry, 5.02% in retail trade industry, and 10.25% in other industries.  
We find no statistical difference in the proportion of firms in each industry between these two 
samples, suggesting that the industries in our initial sample of 1,225 firms are representative of 
the total population.  
Next, we merged that dataset with the Execucomp database, generating a reduced sample 
of 925 firms that both have the director data and the CEO data such as CEO service time and 
CEO ownership.  The Execucomp database provides the data of executive compensation and 
executive information for about 2,698 U.S. firms.  Then, we reviewed the proxy statements of 
these 925 firms using the SEC’s EDGAR database to collect the data that is not available in both 
the IRRC and the Execucomp databases, including the number of directors’ additional board 
seats and the largest ownership.5  Thus, the sample is reduced to 897 firms with the data for each 
of the six compensation committee characteristics.   
To examine whether the 897 firms differ in any significant way from the 1,255 firms, we 
compare firm size (i.e., total assets), earnings performance (i.e., ROE), and book-to-market value 
between the two samples.  The t-statistics are 0.24, 0.17, and 0.03 for firm size, earnings 
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performance, and book-to-market value, respectively, and all are insignificant, suggesting that 
the 897 firms do not significantly differ from the 1,255 firms.  Finally, by excluding the 
observations without financial statement data required for this study in Compustat, the final 
sample is generated, which consists of 844 firms with independent compensation committees.  
The distribution by industry for this sample is manufacturing industry (48.51%), services 
industry (14.38%), transportation, communication, electric, gas, and sanitary services industry 
(11.02%), finance, insurance, and real estate industry (9.34%), and retail trade industry (8.76%) 
are the most widely represented in the sample.6  Our sample is significantly larger than the 
sample used by Sun et al. (2009). 
 
4.2       Model 
 
             To test the four hypotheses, we conduct the main analysis based on the following cross-
sectional regression model:7 
          CCQ = β0 + β1 CEOOWN + β2 CEOTEN+ β3 INSHD+ β4 GROW+ β5 FSIZE  
                        + industry fixed effects + ε                                                                               (1) 
where CCQ is compensation committee quality; CEOOWN  is CEO ownership, measured by the 
percentage of shares owned by the CEO; CEOTEN is CEO tenure, measured by the number of 
years for which the incumbent CEO has been the CEO of the firm; INSHD is institutional 
shareholdings, measured by the percentage of shares owned by institutional investors; GROW is 
growth opportunities, measured by the geometric growth rate in the market value of assets 
through the previous three years,8 and FSIZE is firm size, measured by the log of total assets. 
           Based on Sun et al. (2009), compensation committee quality is measured as the factor 
score (i.e., factor 1) from a PCA of six compensation committee characteristics – CAPDIR, 
SNRDIR, CEODIR, BSHDIR, ADDDIR, and CMSIZE.9  By definition, factor 1 accounts for the 
highest percentage of the total variance.  Thus, this factor score extracts a component that is 
mostly common to the six committee characteristics.   CAPDIR is CEO appointed directors, 
measured as the proportion of directors on the compensation committee appointed during the 
tenure of the incumbent CEO multiplied by -1.  SNRDIR is senior directors, measured as the 
proportion of senior directors with 20 or more years of board service time on the compensation 
committee.  CEODIR is CEO directors, measured as the proportion of the CEOs of other firms 
on the compensation committee multiplied by -1.  BSHDIR is block shareholding directors, 
measured as the proportion of the directors with block shareholding on the compensation 
committee.  ADDDIR is additional directorships, measured as the proportion of directors who 
have additional three or more board seats on the compensation committee multiplied by -1.  
CMSIZE is committee size, measured as the number of directors on the compensation committee.  
In computing CAPDIR, CEODIR, and ADDDIR, we multiply by -1 so that higher values indicate 
higher quality (see Sun et al., 2009, 1509-1510).  
           Following Boone et al. (2007), we use CEO ownership and CEO tenure as proxies for 
CEO influence.  CEO ownership is used as a proxy for CEO influence because CEOs with high 
ownership can execute their rights as block shareholders, thus weakening the monitoring role of 
other shareholders.  CEO tenure is used as proxy for CEO influence because CEOs with long 
tenure are likely to be entrenched.   
In eq. (1), we control for industry fixed effects using the dummy variables for two-digit 
SIC industries from which there are at least 10 firms in the sample.  We expect that β1 and β2 will 
be significantly negative if CEO influence impairs the governance quality of compensation 
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committees.  We also expect that the coefficient β4 will be significantly negative given that firms 
with high growth opportunities can use equity-based pay to reduce agency costs, limiting the 
need for other high quality governance mechanisms including high quality compensation 
committees.  As discussed above, we do not predict signs for β3 or β5.  
 
5.        Empirical results 
 
           Table I, panel A provides the descriptive statistics for the six compensation committee 
characteristics.  CAPDIR, CEODIR and ADDDIR have negative means as these measures were 
inverted.  Overall, 43.6% of compensation committee members were appointed by the current 
CEO.  Approximately 6% have more than 20 years of experience.  CEO directors account for 
21% of compensation committee members, and one-third of members serve on three or more 
boards.  Block shareholding directors make up 2.7% of compensation committee members, and 
the mean size of the compensation committee is 3.5 members.  Table I, panel B reports that the 
eigenvalue for the first factor from our PCA is 1.28.  Table I, panel C shows the factor loadings.  
All six compensation committee characteristics have positive signs.  While resulting factor is a 
statistical artifact of PCA, we draw on Sun et al. (2009) to interpret the meaning of this factor. 
They provide evidence that the first factor from a PCA of the same six compensation committee 
characteristics has a positive effect on the relation between stock option grants and future firm 
performance.  Thus, the first factor is associated with pay packages that better incentivize CEOs, 
an outcome that reflects higher compensation committee quality.  Based on their evidence, we 
use this factor score as a measure of compensation committee quality and labelled it CCQ in the 
remaining tests.  
          Table II reports the descriptive statistics for the variables in eq. (1).  By construction, the 
mean for CCQ is zero while the median is -0.275.  Table III provides Pearson correlation 
coefficients between the independent variables.  CEO ownership and CEO tenure exhibit the 
highest pairwise correlation as is expected since these variables are both measuring CEO 
influence (r = 0.358).  CEO ownership is negatively correlated with institutional holdings (r = -
0.150).  Also, firm size is negatively correlated with CEO ownership (r = -0.152), suggesting that 
CEOs hold more shares of equity in smaller firms.  Institutional ownership is positively 
associated with growth as the correlation coefficient between institutional holdings and growth 
opportunities is 0.119.  Further, institutional holdings are not significantly correlated with firm 
size.  More generally, there are no extreme correlations variables among the independent 
variables, suggesting that multicollinearity is unlikely to be severe in our regressions. 
           Table IV contains the results for the main regression.  The coefficient on CEO tenure is -
0.023 and is significantly negative (t-statistic = -4.29), consistent with H1. However, the 
coefficient on CEO ownership is not significantly negative (t-statistic = -0.01) so H1 is not 
supported using CEOOWN as a measure of CEO influence.  The coefficient on institutional 
holdings is -0.977 and is significant (t-statistic = -4.85), suggesting that compensation committee 
quality is lower for firms with higher institutional ownership (a substitute corporate governance 
mechanism) in line with H2.  Also, the coefficient on growth opportunities is -0.126 and is 
significant at the 5% level (t-statistic = -1.65, one-tailed test), providing some support for H3.  
This suggests that high growth firms place less emphasis on having a high quality compensation 
committee.  Finally, the coefficient on firm size is significant (t-statistic = -2.78) consistent with 
H4.  The negative association between CCQ and firm size is consistent with the view that large 
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firms have more alternative governance mechanisms that may substitute for compensation 
committees. 
 
Table I. Descriptive statistics and principal component analysis of six compensation committee 
characteristics 
 
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics on six compensation committee characteristics (N=844) 
              
Variable  Mean Median Std Dev    Q1   Q3 
CAPDIR  -0.436 -0.333 0.385 -0.750 0.000 
SNRDIR  0.061 0.000 0.152 0.000 0.000 
CEODIR  -0.217 -0.200 0.243 -0.333 0.000 
BSHDIR  0.027 0.000 0.104 0.000 0.000 
ADDDIR  -0.333 -0.333 -0.303 0.000 -0.500 
CMSIZE   3.472  3.000  1.217  3.000  4.000 
 
Panel B. Total variance explained  
        
Component Eigenvalue % of Variance Cumulative % 
Factor 1 1.282 21.373 21.373 
Factor 2 1.138 18.964 40.337 
Factor 3 1.001 16.685 57.022 
 
Panel C. Factor loadings 
    
Variable   Factor 1  
-CAPDIR  0.432  
  SNRDIR  0.756  
-CEODIR  0.288  
  BSHDIR  0.575  
-ADDDIR  0.316  
  CMSIZE  0.100  
   
 
Notes:  CAPDIR is CEO appointed directors, measured as the proportion of directors on the compensation 
committee appointed during the tenure of the incumbent CEO.  SNRDIR is senior directors, measured as the 
proportion of senior directors with 20 or more years of board service time on the compensation committee.  
CEODIR is CEO directors, measured as the proportion of the CEOs of other firms on the compensation 
committee.  BSHDIR is block shareholding directors, measured as the proportion of the directors with block 
shareholding on the compensation committee.  ADDDIR is additional directorships, measured as the 
proportion of directors who have additional three or more board seats on the compensation committee.  
CMSIZE is committee size, measured as the number of directors on the compensation committee.  
   
 
            To investigate H1 further, we conduct two additional analyses.  First, because CEOOWN 
and CEOTEN are both measures of CEO influence and because they are significantly correlated, 
we combine these measures into a single measure of CEO influence by factor analyzing the two 
variables.  Thus, we use the factor scores from the first factor as an overall measure of CEO 
influence, CEOINF.  We re-estimate eq. (1) using CEOINF in place of CEOOWN and CEOTEN.  
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Table V, columns 3 and 4 present the results for this regression.  The coefficient on CEO 
influence is significantly negative (t-statistic = -3.82), suggesting that the overall CEO influence 
measured jointly by CEO ownership and CEO tenure is negatively related to compensation 
committee quality which supports H1. 
 
Table II. Descriptive statistics on variables 
 
Variable  Mean Median Std Dev     Q1     Q3 
CCQ  0.000 -0.275 1.000 -0.628 0.329 
CEOOWN  0.019 0.000 0.049 0.000 0.012 
CEOTEN  7.645 6.000 6.748 3.000 11.000 
INSHD  0.624 0.650 0.179 0.501 0.751 
GROW  1.190 1.067 0.467 0.956 1.274 
FSIZE  7.543 7.318 1.676 6.340 8.580 
       
Notes: CCQ is compensation committee quality, measured as the factor score (i.e., factor1) from the factor 
analysis of six compensation committee characteristics.  CEOOWN is CEO ownership, measured as the 
percentage of shares owned by the CEO.  CEOTEN is CEO tenure, measured as the number of years for 
which the incumbent CEO has been the CEO of the firm.  INSHD is institutional shareholding, measured 
as the percentage of shares owned by institutional investors.  GROW is growth opportunities, measured as 
the geometric growth rate in the market value of assets through the previous three years.  FSIZE is firm 
size, measured as the log of total assets.  
 
 
 
Table III. Pearson correlations between independent variables 
          
  CEOTEN INSHD GROW FSIZE 
CEOOWN 0.358*** -0.150*** -0.004 -0.152*** 
CEOTEN  -0.010 0.072** -0.042 
INSHD   0.119*** -0.012 
GROW    -0.020 
     
Notes: ***, ** denotes significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
 
         Second, we examine whether the results for CEO influence still hold if CEO tenure is 
excluded from eq. (1).  This concern is due to the mechanical relationship between CEO tenure 
and CAPDIR.10   Table V, columns 5 and 6 show these results.  We find that CEO ownership 
becomes negatively associated with CCQ and that its coefficient is significant (t-statistic = -1.64, 
one-tailed test), consistent with H1.  This suggests that in our main results, CEOTEN dominates 
CEOOWN, and once CEOTEN is removed, CEOOWN becomes significant.  We also use CEO 
duality, which is coded “1” if the CEO is the chairman and “0” otherwise, to measure CEO 
influence in eq. (1).  We find that CEO duality is significant and negatively signed which 
supports H1 (untabulated t-statistic = -1.46, one-tailed test). 
         We conduct additional tests to examine the robustness of our results.  First, we add several 
control variables to eq. (1).  The control variables include industry concentration, leverage, firm 
performance, CEO retirement, and largest shareholdings.  Industry concentration is measured by 
the sum of sales for the largest four firms in the two-digit industry divided by the sum of sales 
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for all firms in the industry.  Leverage is the debt-to-assets ratio.  Firm performance is return on 
equity.  CEO retirement is an indicator coded “1” if the CEO is at least 63 years old and 0 
otherwise.  Largest shareholding is measured as the maximum percentage of common shares 
owned by a party.  Industry concentration and CEO retirement are related to managers’ ability to 
seek private benefits which may affect managers’ incentives to influence the formation of 
compensation committees.  Largest shareholding is included in the model as it may affect 
managerial influence and have substitute monitoring mechanisms.  Since a firm’s financing 
policy and performance may relate to its corporate governance structure, we also add leverage 
and firm performance as control variables.  The results are similar to those reported earlier.  
Specifically, we find support for H1 with CEOTEN, and H2, H3, and H4 are supported 
(untabulated t-statistics = -4.38, -4.76, -1.59 (one-tailed test for H3), and -2.96, respectively).   
On the other hand, none of the control variables is significantly related to compensation 
committee quality. 
          
Table IV. Relations between compensation committee quality and firm characteristics 
            
                                                                                                                        
Variable Predicted sign           Coefficient             t-statistic 
    
Constant +/- 1.434 6.09*** 
CEOOWN 
- -0.008 -0.01 
CEOTEN 
- -0.023 -4.29*** 
INSHD +/- -0.977 -4.85*** 
GROW 
- -0.126 -1.65** 
FSIZE +/- -0.064 -2.78*** 
  
  
Industry dummies    Included 
   
 
N   844 
F-statistic   3.56*** 
Adjusted R2   8.36% 
    
Notes: The regression model is as follows: 
CCQ = β0 + β1 CEOOWN + β2 CEOTEN + β3 INSHD + β4 GROW + β5 FSIZE + industry fixed effects+ ε   
***, ** denotes significance at the level 1% and 5% levels, respectively.  Tests are one-tailed where a sign is 
predicted and two-tailed otherwise  
 
            Second, we examine whether the earlier results still hold after allowing for the 
endogenous relationship between corporate governance and CEO influence.  To control for this 
endogenous relationship, we use a two-stage regression procedure similar to a procedure used by 
Frankel et al. (2006).  We first rank firms by CEO ownership (i.e., CEOOWN) and then 
categorize them into three equal-sized portfolios. The portfolio rank of CEOOWN (i.e., 
CEOOWNRANK) is measured by 0, 1 or 2 for firms in the lowest, middle or highest portfolio, 
respectively.  Similarly, the portfolio rank of CEO tenure (i.e., CEOTENRANK) is measured by 
0, 1 or 2 based on the firms’ ranking of CEO tenure.  We add CEOOWNRANK or 
CEOTENRANK in the models because endogeneity is likely to affect the variation in CEOOWN 
or CEOTEN rather than the level of CEOOWN or CEOTEN (e.g., Greene, 2000).  Hentschel and 
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Kothari (2001) note that a relatively crude measure of the endogenous variable can be used as an 
instrumental variable because it is likely to capture the level of the variable, but not the 
endogenously determined variations around those levels. 
 
Table V. Relations between compensation committee quality and firm characteristics with 
 overall measure of CEO influence and with CEO tenure omitted  
 
 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient      t-statistic 
      
Constant +/- 1.330 5.77*** 1.312 5.56*** 
CEOINF - -0.131 -3.82***   
INSHD +/- -1.051 -5.26*** -1.023 -5.03*** 
GROW - -0.131 -1.78** -0.144 -1.86** 
FSIZE +/- -0.067 -2.91*** -0.064 -2.73*** 
CEOOWN -   -1.175 -1.64* 
    
  
Industry dummies      Included 
 
    Included 
    
  
N   844 
 
        844 
F-statistic   3.44*** 
 
2.99*** 
Adjusted R2   7.74% 
 
6.40% 
      
Notes: The regression model (columns 3 and 4) is as follows: 
CCQ = α0 + α1 CEOINF + α2 INSHD + α3 GROW + α4 FSIZE + industry fixed effects + ε                
where CEOINF is the factor score from the factor analysis of CEOOWN and CEOTEN. 
             The regression model (columns 5 and 6) is as follows: 
CCQ = γ0 + γ1 CEOOWN + γ2 INSHD + γ3 GROW + γ4 FSIZE + industry fixed effects + ε    
***, **, and *denotes significance at the level 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  Tests are one-tailed where a 
sign is predicted and two-tailed otherwise  
 
 Thus, our first stage regression models are as follows: 
CEOOWN = ω0 + ω1INSHD + ω2GROW+ ω3 FSIZE+ ω4CEOOWNRANK + ε                      (2)                            
CEOTEN = υ0 + υ1INSHD + υ2GROW+ υ3 FSIZE+ υ4CEOTENRANK + ε     (3)                                          
CEOOWN and CEOTEN in the second stage regression (i.e., eq. (1)) are the fitted values from 
the first stage regressions.  The untabulated statistics for H1 with CEOTEN, and H2, H3, and H4 
are -6.05. -4.62, -1.46 (one-tailed test for H3), and -2.69, respectively.  Thus, the results for our 
second stage regression are substantially unchanged after allowing for the endogeneity.    
          Third, we re-estimate eq. (1) using an aggregate measure of corporate governance quality.  
Specifically, we aggregate the scores on the six compensation committee quality dimensions by 
first creating an indicator variable for each dimension where values greater than the median are 
coded 1.  This approach assumes that each dimension is separate and equally important in 
determining the overall quality of the compensation committee.  We repeat all our analyses, 
including the sensitivity analyses, using the aggregate score in place of CCQ.  The untabulated 
statistics for H1 with CEOTEN, and H2, and H4 are -6.87, -2.33, and -2.67, respectively.  The 
results are qualitatively similar to the reported results except that GROW becomes insignificant.  
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Thus, we do not find support for H3 when an aggregate, composite measure of compensation 
committee quality is used. 
 
6.        Conclusion 
 
This study investigates the economic determinants of corporate governance quality of 
U.S. listed companies’ compensation committees that are composed solely of independent 
directors.  Drawing on Sun et al. (2009), we use six compensation committee composition 
measures to measure compensation committee quality.   Similar to Larcker et al. (2007) and Sun 
et al. (2009), we use PCA to create a composite measure of compensation committee quality 
from these six composition measures.  In the spirit of earlier studies that examine whether 
economic factors are related to board or audit committee quality (e.g., Klein, 2002; Baker and 
Gompers, 2003), we then examine four economic factors that are likely to affect the supply of or 
demand for high quality compensation committees. 
We find that compensation committee governance quality measured is negatively 
associated with CEO tenure, consistent with the conjecture that compensation committee 
governance quality is lower for firms with high CEO influence.  Also, we find that compensation 
committee quality is negatively associated with institutional holdings, suggesting that 
institutional investors actively play a monitoring role, thus reducing the demand for 
compensation committees’ monitoring mechanisms.  Additionally, we document some evidence 
that compensation committee governance quality is significantly lower for firms with high 
growth opportunities.  Finally, we find a negative relation between compensation committee 
quality and firm size, which supports the view that larger firms have alternative governance 
mechanisms that can substitute for a strong compensation committee.   
We contribute to the literature by showing that even in the presence of a requirement to 
have only independent directors on the compensation committee, the quality of compensation 
committees can vary cross-sectionally depending on the firm’s characteristics.  Further, we find 
evidence of substitutive effects between compensation committees and three firm factors – 
institutional shareholders, growth opportunities, and firm size – which suggests that 
compensation committee quality should not be considered in isolation.  Jointly, these results 
suggest that a one-size fits all solution for compensation committee quality might not be optimal 
as different firms face different incentives in composing their compensation committees.   
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 Notes 
                                                 
1
  Compensation committee independence has also been used as a measure of compensation committee quality 
in studies examining compensation committee effectiveness (e.g., Conyon and Peck, 1998; Newman and Mozes, 
1999; Anderson and Bizjak, 2003). 
2
  Larcker et al. (2007), using similar logic, apply PCA to a broader set of corporate governance variables. 
3
  While we use the same six compensation committee characteristics as Sun et al. (2009), our sample size is 
78% larger than their sample (844 firms in our sample vs. 474 firms in their sample) because they require data on 
stock options. 
4
        We focus on firms with solely independent directors since this requirement became mandatory for listed 
firms after 2003.  While these firms voluntarily selected independent compensation committees in 2001, since most 
large U.S. listed firms had independent compensation committees in 2001 (and since the IRRC database focuses on 
large firms), self-selection bias is unlikely to be a major issue.  Using data for 2001 also allows us to avoid the 
effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on corporate governance.    
5
       Other directorships in the IRRC Directors database are only limited to the universe of IRRC firms, which 
means this IRRC data item counts other directorships less than it should. Thus, we review proxy statements to 
collect more precise data of other directorships.   
6
         Similar results are found if the 9.34% of firms in finance, insurance, and real estate industry are excluded 
from the sample.  
7
          The continuous variables in the regression are winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
8
        The market value of assets is measured by the sum of the market value of shareholders’ equity and the book 
value of liabilities.  The geometric growth rate in the market value of assets may be a more explicit and accurate 
proxy for growth opportunities than other proxies such as the market-to-book ratio or R&D intensity because the 
market-to-book ratio also reflects accounting conservatism and R&D intensity is less appropriate for non-high tech 
firms.  
9
          This compensation committee quality measure is determined based on its correlation with the pay-for-
performance (Sun et al., 2009).  This may lead to a bit of bias as the measure may ignore other aspects of 
compensation committee effectiveness.  Since the main duty of compensation committees is to set compensation 
with high pay-for-performance, this is not a major problem. 
10
      The mechanical relationship leads to an extremely high t-statistic for CEO tenure and adjusted R2 when 
CAPDIR is the dependent variable in the regression model (i.e., -25.39 and 47.86%, respectively). 
